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AT THE HARRIMAN INSTITUTE
Overcoming Warlords and State Failure: 
Lessons from Post-Soviet Georgia
O
n Wednesday, November 11, 2009, Kimberly 
Marten, Professor of Political Science at Bar-
nard College, Columbia University, spoke at the 
Harriman Institute about two Georgian warlords—Aslan 
Abashidze and Emzar Kvitsiani. Marten discussed their 
influence in Georgia, and the divergent approaches to-
wards warlordism taken by the administrations of Geor-
gian leaders Eduard Shevardnadze (1992-03) and Mikheil 
Saakashvili (2003-present).
Marten, who is writing a book on “Warlords, Sover-
eignty, and State Failure,” had just returned from Georgia, 
where she conducted 26 interviews with policy makers 
and analysts connected to these cases. Her findings were 
the basis for her presentation and will comprise a chap-
ter in her book. “Until now there have been ideographic 
studies of warlordism, but not a body of theory about the 
relationships between states and warlords. There is noth-
ing to indicate what happens when states take particular 
actions toward warlords.” Marten seeks to formulate this 
theoretical framework.
“I define warlords as individuals who control small 
slices of territory in defiance of state sovereignty, through 
the use of force and patronage.” Marten clarified that 
while warlords function against state interests, this does 
not exclude their cooperation with the state. Warlords can 
infiltrate the bureaucracy and often extend their patron-
age to the government. Warlords sometimes maintain 
control through clans. “The body of political science lit-
erature indicates that clans can form a parallel govern-
ment structure,” but as Marten continued, “clans are not 
as strong as the current literature suggests.” Saakashvili 
demonstrated that it was “easy to peel away clan support-
ers with promises of better conditions.”
Cases of warlordism can be observed across the globe, 
for example, including Pakistan, Afghanistan, Chechnya, 
Iraq, and Somalia. The political economy of warlordism 
is similar across cases. Marten believes that Georgia is a 
particularly interesting case to examine, because of how 
differently two of its administrations have responded to 
warlords. While Shevardnadze accommodated the war-
lords' needs, in part because he felt intimidated and in part 
because he benefited from the connections, Saakashvili 
unseated these leaders and restored Georgia's sovereignty 
over their territories. “To my knowledge this is the only 
case in modern history where state leaders have dealt so 
differently with warlordism in the same country,” Marten 
noted. She added that Abashidze and Kvitsiani were what
she calls “middlemen” warlords, because they remained 
in power with Russian or Abkhazian support, operating 
between two states—Russia and Georgia.
Aslan Abashidze was a high-ranking official in both the 
Georgian and the Ajarian Communist parties until the fall 
of the Soviet Union. “This means that he had a lot of con-
nections with political figures emerging in the post-Sovi-
et space,” Marten said. In 1991, Abashidze was elected 
chairman of the Parliament of Ajara. Marten explained 
that his election was semi-legal. Georgia's first president, 
Zviad Gamsakhurdia, had pressured the chairman of the 
parliament to resign and then swayed the parliament to 
elect Abashidze. “While Abashidze's election was techni-
cally legal, it was actually an exercise of force.” Simulta-
neously Abashidze became deputy chairman of Georgia's 
national parliament and remained in this position for sev-
eral years.
Once Abashidze became chairman he formed his 
own militia and created a border separating Ajara from 
the rest of Georgia, forcing Georgian citizens to show 
their passports when they crossed the border, and stamp-
ing their passports with Ajaran “visas.” Using the civil 
war in Georgia as an excuse, Abashidze dissolved the 
parliament with an emergency decree. In response, local 
political leaders sent an open letter to Georgian authori-
ties, calling Abashidze's actions illegal. Nevertheless, 
Shevardnadze continued to accommodate the separat-
ist leader, treating him as an ally and helping him win 
elections through backdoor deals. Under Shevardnadze's 
presidency Abashidze was able to establish a separate 
National Security Council and Interior Ministry. He used 
these institutions to terrorize the population of Ajara. Ac-
cording to the Saakashvili government, he also ran a $100 
million narcotics smuggling ring, and appropriated the 
national oil taxes from the Batumi oil terminal.
Marten elaborated that oil would arrive in Batumi 
(Ajara's capital) via the Black Sea, where it would be 
transferred to rail cars. Abashidze would bribe Georgian 
Railway Ministry officials to say that all oil delivered 
through the railway was going beyond Georgian bor-
ders. Transit oil is supposed to be tax-free, but Abashidze 
would have customs officials collect taxes from the ship-
pers, and then keep the money in Ajara instead of sending 
it to state authorities. The oil would then be distributed 
within Georgia, instead of beyond its borders, following 
Abashidze's orders to the Railway Ministry. As a result
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Georgia lost over 60 percent of its oil tax revenue to 
Abashidze.
Shevardnadze also made electoral deals with 
Abashidze's Revival Party and allowed the Abashidze 
clan to control all government posts in Ajara. Marten in-
dicated that these electoral deals helped to provoke Geor-
gia's Rose Revolution in 2003. “In 2003, Shevardnadze 
announced that he would not run for reelection in 2005, 
and people were frightened,” Marten recounted, since it 
appeared that Shevardnadze had anointed Abashidze as 
his chosen successor. Abashidze secured a supposedly 
tremendous “official” electoral victory in 2003, but as 
independent exit polls showed, this victory was clearly 
fixed. As a result, people worried that once Shevard-
nadze's term came to an end, there would be another en-
gineering of elections in Abashidze's favor. “Georgians 
were scared that Abashidze would lead the country in 
Shevardnadze's place.”
The efforts of the Rose Revolution demonstrators in 
the fall of 2003 brought down Shevardnadze and replaced 
him with Saakashvili, who later was elected president 
in the snap election of January 2004. “Saakashvili had 
overwhelming popular support, even in Ajara,” remarked 
Marten. In response to the Rose Revolution, Abashid-
ze declared a state of emergency in Ajara, lashing out 
against protestors in the region. This immediately created 
a different dynamic between Saakashvili and Abashidze 
than the one that had existed between the warlord and 
Shevardnadze. Georgian officials and analysts as well 
as the international community feared there might be a 
military clash. At one point Abashidze stationed tanks on 
the Choloki Bridge, which separates Ajara from the rest 
of Georgia along the main highway. At another point he 
blew up the bridge, saying that he was preventing Geor-
gian forces from invading. Marten showed the audience 
a photograph of the bridge and the river below it; the river 
is actually quite shallow and narrow. “Standing on the 
bridge I realized that the majority of this situation was 
just theater; the Georgians could easily have sent forces 
and crossed the river.”
Abashidze was sent into exile in May 2004. The Geor-
gian government presented Saakashvili's victory over the 
warlord as a reflection of both the state's strength and the 
overwhelming popular support that Saakashvili and the 
Rose Revolution had generated. Among other pressure 
tactics, Saakashvili closed Ajara's airspace, blocked the 
Batumi Port, closed the Sarpi customs point and froze 
the bank accounts of Ajarian officials. Marten concluded 
that a full explanation for Saakashvili's success, however, 
also includes his ability to peel off Abashidze's support-
ers. “He didn't really make a clean sweep, but just dust-
ed off the furniture and rearranged it.” While the media 
dwelled on Saakashvili's hardliner tactics and popularity, 
there is more to the story. He “wooed a lot of Abashidze
supporters with promises of immunity from prosecution, 
allowing the wealthy to keep their wealth and political 
positions in exchange for donations to the state of Ajara.”
Abashidze was not punished—he has lived luxuri-
ously in Moscow since his exile. Saakashvili replaced 
him with Levan Varshalomidze, the son of Abashidze's 
former prime minister. He was installed without elec-
tions, and wields enormous power in Ajara on behalf of 
the Saakashvili regime. If Saakashvili had not wielded 
relatively authoritarian control over Ajara, he would have 
been unable to unseat Abashidze, since an independent 
judiciary might not have agreed to give immunity to his 
supporters and an independent electorate might not have 
wanted to see his supporters in political office. Further-
more, Saakashvili's tactics may not be applicable in states 
that lack developed bureaucracies and popular leaders, 
such as Afghanistan.
Marten described Emzar Kvitsiani as a “gang leader and 
jailbird” who controlled several of Abkhazia's casinos. 
He got his start as a separatist leader in 1993, during the 
Abkhazia-Georgia war, commanding a militia called the 
Monadire (“Hunter”). A number of Abkhazian refugees 
fled to Georgia proper through Kodori Gorge, a moun-
tainous region in Abkhazia that extends to the northeast 
from Sukhumi. Militias that may have included Kvitsiani 
supporters destroyed the road through the gorge, forc-
ing refugees to travel by foot and then demanding pay-
ment for their safe passage. The 1994 Moscow Ceasefire 
Agreement between Georgia and Abkhazia legitimized 
Kvitsiani's control over Upper Kodori, referring to that 
small area as a demilitarized zone where “local civil au-
thorities” would provide security. These authorities were 
the Monadire.
Shevardnadze did not try to confront Kvitsiani un-
til 1999, when he sent a delegation from Tbilisi to Up-
per Kodori. “The upper part of Kodori Gorge is difficult 
to reach—for eight months out of the year you can only 
get there by helicopter on clear days,” Marten explained. 
“Kvitsiani's militia greeted the delegation and then beat 
them up, shoving them back into the helicopter that 
brought them.”
During his reign Kvitsiani led a timber smuggling op-
eration that sent local lumber tax-free to Turkey through 
Abkhazia. He also had control over Tbilisi's electricity 
supply, holding hostage the high voltage power line that 
ran over Upper Kodori from Russia, and plunging Tbilisi 
into blackouts when he was unhappy with Shevardnadze. 
Shevardnadze paid Kvitsiani $50,000 a month in “hu-
manitarian aid” in return for the security of Tbilisi's elec-
tricity.
Saakashvili sought to change this situation. Two 
of his major advisors, Irakli Alasania, chairman of the 
Tbilisi-based Abkhazia-government-in-exile, and Irakli
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Okruashvili, the defense minister, disagreed about which 
path to take in dealing with the region, however. Alasa- 
nia wanted to reform the Monadire, while Okruashvili 
deemed the Monadire useless and wanted to implement 
armed police action and overthrow Kvitsiani.
In 2006 the Georgian government took militarized 
police action, sending troops into the mountains to over-
throw Kvitsiani. While a few Kvitsiani supporters shot 
at the Georgians, it is clear that there was an agreement 
made between the Georgian side and the Monadire to 
avoid major bloodshed. For example, it took 12-13 hours 
for the Georgian forces to drive up the mountains to Up-
per Kodori; the Monadire had clear sight lines, and could 
have laid mines on the road, but chose not to do so. “The 
Monadire melted away and the Georgian troops captured 
35 wanted criminals.” Marten speculates that this was the 
result of a similar type of deal to the one with Abashidze's 
clan.
Unlike the Abashidze deal, the agreement with Kvit- 
siani did not go according to plan. “Everyone I inter-
viewed told me that something in this deal went wrong, 
but no one knows what it was.” Kvitsiani was supposed to 
have stayed in Tbilisi, but instead he went back to Kodori. 
There was not supposed to be shooting from Kvitsiani's 
side, but there was some shooting from a small number 
of his supporters. After the raid, Kvitsiani managed to es-
cape, and some say the Abkhaz had agreed to jail him but 
did not. “My understanding is that if the deal had gone 
properly, Kvitsiani would be in Tbilisi or perhaps impris-
oned right now.” There is speculation that when the au-
thorities could not get Kvitsiani, they captured his sister 
Nora and imprisoned her instead. “There were people far 
guiltier than Nora and this appears to have been a sym-
bolic move, because the authorities couldn't get Kvit- 
siani,” Marten noted.
After Georgia regained control of this small section 
of Abkhazia, Saakashvili moved the Abkhazia govern-
ment-in-exile from Tbilisi to Kodori Gorge, and pledged 
to spend $10 million per year from the state budget on re-
construction, in order to make the area a showcase for the 
rest of Abkhazia and attract Abkhazians back into Geor-
gia's fold. Reconstruction efforts had actually started in 
summer 2005, when Kvitsiani was living in Tbilisi, and 
appear to have been part of the effort to woo Kvitsiani's 
supporters. These expenditures would likely not have 
been possible if real democratic debate were allowed 
in Georgia, since at this time the entire social services 
budget of Georgia was only $350 million per year, and 
the country is burdened by poverty, unemployment, and 
healthcare and education systems that are in great need 
of reform. Georgian authorities also deployed U.S.-made 
weapons in the region.
These gestures, alongside Saakashvili's claim that 
he was making the new “Upper Abkhazia” a showcase, 
aggravated relations with Russia and contributed to the 
tensions leading to the 2008 war. “Saakashvili's biggest 
mistake was in pulling the tail of the tiger,” Marten con-
tended. Upper Kodori was retaken by Russian-supported 
Abkhaz forces in the war, in a move that was clearly coor-
dinated with actions in South Ossetia. Meanwhile Kvit- 
siani is rumored to be living freely in Abkhazia.
Marten concluded that “the message to learn from 
these cases is that warlords themselves are pretty expend-
able.” Their supporters can be easily peeled away by a 
strong state, and as middlemen they may be useful for 
protecting realist power interests, but are not worth going 
to war over. “Russia was not interested in the individu-
als,” Marten said. “What went wrong in Upper Kodori 
was probably that Saakashvili pushed too hard.” What 
Saakashvili demonstrated, though, is that success in deal-
ing with warlords may be easiest for a state that is not a 
liberal democracy.
Reported by Masha Udensiva-Brenner
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